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Gender quotas for corporate boards have risen in popularity ever since Norway implemented the first
quota in 2003. Proponents point to economic arguments (i.e. enhanced return on assets and return on
equity) as well as social good rationales (i.e. bolstered corporate social responsibility and reduced fraud)
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equality, although more heavily relying on empirical claims.
This article demonstrates how empirical rationales in support of gender quotas are unconvincing.
Economic evidence is ultimately inconclusive, and the social good justifications alone do not serve as
compelling policy objectives. With respect to equality, the article distinguishes between equality of
outcome and equality of opportunity, explaining how gender quotas provide equal outcome but do not
satisfy equal opportunity. Finally, the article points to two more robust objectives for all gender workplace
advancement policies, namely, equal opportunity and autonomy.
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ABSTRACT
Gender quotas for corporate boards have risen in popularity ever since Norway
implemented the first quota in 2003. Proponents point to economic arguments (i.e. enhanced
return on assets and return on equity) as well as social good rationales (i.e. bolstered corporate
social responsibility and reduced fraud) to validate their enactment. Advocates further gloss over
a moral justification rooted in a broad notion of equality, although more heavily relying on
empirical claims.
This article demonstrates how empirical rationales in support of gender quotas are
unconvincing. Economic evidence is ultimately inconclusive, and the social good justifications
alone do not serve as compelling policy objectives. With respect to equality, the article
distinguishes between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity, explaining how gender
quotas provide equal outcome but do not satisfy equal opportunity. Finally, the article points to
two more robust objectives for all gender workplace advancement policies, namely, equal
opportunity and autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan sparked a momentous movement advocating for
workplace gender equality after its publishing in 1963. Denoting it as “the problem that has no
name,” Friedan captures the frustration and even despair of a generation of college-educated
housewives who felt trapped and unfulfilled. 1 Friedan writes:
The chains that bind [the suburban housewife] in her trap are chains in her own
mind and spirit. They are chains made up of mistaken ideas and misinterpreted
facts, of incomplete truths and unreal choices. They are not easily seen and
shaken off. 2
The Feminine Mystique transformed the attitudes of women in the 1960s, challenging the
assumption that women should remain housewives and calling upon women to seek fulfillment
in work outside the home.
Over the next 30 years, numerous strides were made toward equalizing gender roles at
home as well as at work. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act barred workplace discrimination
against females, the number of working women increased from roughly 32 percent in 1964 to 48
percent in 1992, 3 and the gender wage gap diminished by roughly twelve percentage points over
the same time-period. 4
However, progress toward advancing women in the workplace stalled in recent years.
The gender wage gap has decreased only marginally over the past two decades. 5 Working

1

Friedan, Betty. 1963. The feminine mystique. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Id. pg. 32
3
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/converging-toward-equality-female-employment-from-1964-totoday/264625/
4 Women went from earning roughly 59 percent of a man’s dollar in 1964 to earning around 71 percent of a man’s dollar in
1992. http://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html
5
Working women in the United States made 78 percent of what men earned in 2014, and 72 percent of every man’s dollar
two decades earlier in 1994.
2

women face a challenge to both advance their careers and fulfill the important societal role of
bearing and raising children, as they are not guaranteed paid maternity leave in the United
States. 6 Managers – both male and female – continue to favor men over equally qualified women
in hiring, compensation, performance evaluation and promotion decisions due to entrenched
gender biases against women in the workplace. 7
As of 2015, women working at S&P 500 companies constituted 45 percent of the entrylevel workforce, yet only nineteen percent were directors and a mere four percent were CEOs. 8
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to bolster diversity in the
workplace by mandating a diversity disclosure requirement on proxy statements of all public
companies. 9 Yet evidence also shows that over half of the diversity disclosures among the
Fortune 50 companies fail to fully comply with the rule’s requirements. 10 Furthermore, firms are
able to define the concept of “diversity” on their own, perhaps affording them too much
discretion and giving them an ‘out’ to skirt the responsibility of empowering minorities –
including women – in the workplace. 11
It is therefore important to turn to countries aside from the United States and analyze how
they are handling their own gender advancement workplace policies. In Western Europe, we see
a stark increase in gender quotas for corporate boards.

Council of Economic Advisors. (2014). Women's participation in education and the workforce. The Office of the President of the
United States.
6
Coontz, Stephanie. 2013. Why gender equality stalled. New York Times, February 15, 2013, 2013, sec Sunday Review.
7
A meta-analysis of gender stereotypes and bias in experimental simulations of employment decision making.Koch,
Amanda J.; D’Mello, Susan D.; Sackett, Paul R.Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 100(1), Jan 2015, 128-161.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036734
8
Catalyst, http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies
9
Based on 2012 data. Dhir, Aaron A., Homogeneous Corporate Governance Cultures (2014). Dhir, A. (2015).
Homogeneous Corporate Governance Cultures. Chapter 1 in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance,
and Diversity. New York: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming; Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 64/2014; Yale
Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 521. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2487149
10
Smallman, Tamara, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC's Role in Cracking the Door Open so Women May Enter (June 27,
2013). 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 801 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286147
11
Id.

The United States is not alone in its disproportional representation of women at the top of
the corporate ladder relative to its active female labor force. Norway, France, Britain and
numerous other developed economies have struggled to promote women in the workplace;
emerging economies lag even further behind. In 2003, Norway attempted to address this issue by
passing the first gender quota for corporate boards. 12 At the time, only nine percent of the
country’s corporate board members were women, and the new quota law required firms to
increase their representation of female directors to 40 percent by 2009. 13 Norway soon reached
its numerical goals, compelling other countries – including France, Italy, and Germany – to also
instate gender quotas for corporate boards. 14
Nevertheless, it is important to analyze whether gender quotas are compelling policy
tools with respect to advancing women in the workplace. Proponents point to economic benefits,
such as increased return on equity and operating performance for firms with gender diverse
boards. 15 They further argue gender quotas advance the social good, as firms with more female
directors are more likely to engage in corporate philanthropic giving and better adhere to rules
and regulations. 16 Finally, gender quotas are morally validated through the notion of equality,
which is often perceived as a fundamental right. 17
Critics argue the costs of gender quotas outweigh the apparent benefits. Gender quotas
create a fairness problem, where women are selected solely because of their gender rather than
12

Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas As a Tool For Progress in the
United States and Canada, 32 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 81A (2012).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol32/iss4/6
13
14

Id.

National factsheet gender balance in boards: Italy. 2013. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/womenonboards/womenonboards-factsheet-it_en.pdf
15
Women Matter, McKinsey & Company, 2007 (updated 2013)
16
Bernardi, Richard A. and Threadgill, Veronica H., Women Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility (December 1,
2010). Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organizational Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 15-21, 2010. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752267
17
Wheeler, Sally, Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The Business Case Claim Explored (July 6, 2011). Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880158 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1880158

considering more important factors such a competence or merit. 18 This potentially crowds out the
appointment of men who have better qualifications and would be more effective corporate board
members. Furthermore, there appears to be a pipeline issue, or lack of qualified female workers
available for directorship positions. Because only a handful of women possess executive
experience, gender quotas have given rise to what is pejoratively referred to as ‘Golden Skirts’ in
Norway -- women who sit on multiple boards. 19
Proponents and critics make convincing arguments on either side. Nevertheless, the
opponents’ concerns are too heavily focused on surface consequences rather than considering
whether the policy objectives behind gender quotas are justified in the first place. It is therefore
imperative to analyze whether gender quotas for corporate boards truly fulfill their stated policy
objectives, and if so, whether those aims are compelling in the first place.
This article demonstrates how the current policy objectives underlying the
implementation of gender quotas for corporate boards are either unconvincing or unmet. It then
reconstructs two refined objectives behind the broader class of gender workplace advancement
policies, namely, equality of opportunity and female autonomy. The article concludes that gender
quotas for corporate boards undermine the two purposes underpinning gender workplace
advancement policies, and therefore, the implementation of such quotas should be reconsidered.
The article first examines the history of gender quotas for corporate boards. It then
analyzes each of the current proclaimed purposes for implementing gender quotas for corporate
boards, discovering that they are all either unconvincing or unmet. Next, it identifies the ultimate
objectives for any gender workplace advancement policy, which are equality of opportunity and
autonomy. The article argues that gender quotas for corporate boards (one particular gender

18
19

H.J. The spread of gender quotas for company boards. The Economist, March 25, 2014.
Id.

workplace advancement policy tool) do not fulfill either overarching objective, and, in fact,
hinder them by entrenching the focus on gender. It then considers potential objections. The
article concludes by proposing recommendations for new gender workplace advancement
policies that fulfill the salient equality of opportunity and autonomy objectives.
HISTORY & OVERVIEW OF GENDER QUOTAS FOR CORPORATE BOARDS
Norway was the first country to propose and pass a gender quota in 2003 requiring an
increase in the number of women on corporate boards. 20 Referred to as the Gender Balance Law
(GBL), the initial Norwegian quota was voluntary and only applied to public limited liability
companies. 21 However, it soon became clear that the target of 40% female board membership by
2009 was not going to be met with a lax voluntary quota, thereby compelling the Norwegian
government to make it mandatory in 2008. 22 The Norwegian government further expanded the
quota requirement to apply to the boards of state-owned, municipality-owned and cooperative
companies. 23 Non-complying firms face the penalty of liquidation. 24

20

Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas As a Tool For Progress in
the United States and Canada, 32 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 81A (2012).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol32/iss4/6
21
The Gender Balance Law is formally referred to as Section 6-11a of Norway’s Companies Act, which reads:
§ 6–11a. Requirement regarding the representation of both sexes on the board of directors
(1) On the board of directors of public . . . companies, both sexes shall be represented in the following manner:
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall be represented.
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall be represented by at least two.
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall be represented by at least three.
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be represented by at least four, and if the board of
directors has more members, each sex shall be represented by at least 40 percent.
5. The rules in no. 1 to 4 apply correspondingly for elections of deputy directors.
Kristen Carroll, Norway’s Companies Act: A 10-Year Look at Gender Equality, 26 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 68 (2014),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/7
22 Bøhren Øyvind, Staubo Siv. 2015. Mandatory gender balance & board independence. European Financial Management,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543871
23 Quota systems established in 2004 for state-owned companies; 2009 for municipal and cooperative companies.
Teigen, Mari. 2012. Gemder quotas on corporate boards: On the diffusion of a distinct national policy reform. In Firms, boards
and gender quotas: Comparative perspectives. Vol. 29, 115-146Emerald Group,
http://www.gig.gu.se/digitalAssets/1443/1443377_csr-2012m_teigen1.pdf
24 When GBL was passed, the average proportion of female directors in public companies was approximately 10%.
During the next five years (until the end of the transition period in 2008), firms complying with the 40% quota replaced about
one third of their male directors by females. The number of female directorships increased by 260% (from 165 to 592 seats),
while the number of male directorships dropped by 38% (from 1,516 to 938 seats).

Since then, many countries have followed Norway’s precedent, establishing variations of
gender quota laws for corporate boards. The broad categories of gender quotas are as follows:
binding quotas with sanctions, quotas without sanctions, and voluntary targets. 25 In addition,
many countries have issued gender quotas for the boards of state-owned companies. 26
Countries that have instituted binding gender quotas with sanctions include France, Italy,
and Belgium. 27 In 2011, France ordained a mandatory quota that required a 20% minimum of
corporate board seats to be filled by each gender by 2014 and 40% by 2017. 28 Non-complying
firms faced the revocation of non-compliant nominations and the possibility of freezing board
members’ fees. 29
Italy and Belgium also passed mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards in 2011.
Italy required at least 33% of each gender on the boards of public and state-owned companies by
2015, instating a target of 20% during the four year transitional period. 30 Italy’s sanctions in the
event of noncompliance include a progressive warning system that would eventually lead to the
board’s dissolution. 31 Belgium’s quota law requires a minimum of 33% percent of each gender

Ahern, Kenneth R., and Amy Dittmar. 2012. "The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female
Board Representation." Quaterly Journal of Economics no. 127 (1):137–197
25 European Commission. 2012. Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report. Luxembourg: European
Union, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf
26 Id. 13
27 Id. 13
28 Law 2011-103 (January 27, 2011) entitled “On the equal representation of men and women on boards of directors and
supervisory boards and professional equality.”
The law applies to boards of directors, supervisory boards of private companies or joint-stock companies of any size, listed and
unlisted.
Rosenblum Darren. 2014. Equality regimes compared: France's political and corporate culture. Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies Research Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535216
29 Id. 5
30
At the time of passing, Italy had one of the lowest female corporate board member ratios in Europe, at around 6%.
Zampano, Giada. 2012. Italy to push 'pink quotas'. Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2012,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577431832161133916
31 National factsheet gender balance in boards: Italy. 2013. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/womenonboards/womenonboards-factsheet-it_en.pdf

to be represented on the boards of public and state-owned companies by 2018. 32 Non-complying
firms are fined. 33
Gender quotas without sanctions have been enacted in Spain, Iceland, the Netherlands,
Germany, Malaysia and India. 34 In 2007, Spain legally encouraged large publicly traded
companies to reach a corporate board gender ratio of 40% women by 2015. 35 Iceland soon
followed in 2010, recommending at least 40 percent of each gender to be represented on the
boards of all publicly listed companies and companies with more than 50 employees by 2013. 36
As of 2011, the Netherlands has required both public and private firms with more than 250
employees to have at least 30% of each gender on their executive and supervisory boards, with a
“comply or explain” mechanism for those who fail to reach the target. 37 Most recently in 2015,
Germany set quota targets for the boards of large publicly traded companies. 38 The law requires
that at least 30% of new board seats be reserved for women in 2016, pushing the ratio up to 50%
by 2018. 39

32 Belgium has had robust history of gender quotas in political institutions. Electoral quotas have been in Belgian politics
since 1994; the 2002 Belgium Parity Law demands equal representation of men and women in political decision-making
assemblies.
Teigen, Mari. 2012. Gender quotas on corporate boards: On the diffusion of a distinct national policy reform. In Firms, boards
and gender quotas: Comparative perspectives. Vol. 29, 115-146Emerald Group,
http://www.gig.gu.se/digitalAssets/1443/1443377_csr-2012m_teigen1.pdf
33
Id. 129
34
Catalyst. Legislative board diversity. 20142016, http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-board-diversity#footnote1_k692yzn
35 Formally referred to as Article 75 of Spanish Organic Law. No sanctions are imposed on non-complying firms.
Giovinco, Angela. 2014. Gender diversity in the boardroom. context and spanish case. Corporate Board: Role, Duties &
Composition 10 (3): 60-76, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466982
36 In 2008, prior to the adoption of the corporate board quota, there were only 7% women on the boards of listed
companies.
Teigen, Mari. 2012. Gender quotas on corporate boards: On the diffusion of a distinct national policy reform. In Firms, boards
and gender quotas: Comparative perspectives. Vol. 29, 115-146Emerald Group,
http://www.gig.gu.se/digitalAssets/1443/1443377_csr-2012m_teigen1.pdf
37 Id. 129
38 Women occupied only 7% of executive board seats of DAX companies prior to the adoption of the legislation.
Zeldin, Wendy. Germany: Gender quotas for large companies and for federal bodies. in Library of Congress [database online].
2015, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-gender-quotas-for-large-companies-and-for-federal-bodies/
39 Id.

In addition to the clear diffusion of gender quotas for corporate boards throughout
Europe, 40 non-European countries have also adopted such policies. In 2011, the Malaysian
government instituted a quota without sanctions targeting 30% women on the boards of publicly
listed companies within five years. 41 India passed a 2013 mandate requiring the board of
directors of nearly all publicly listed companies to have at least one female member. 42
Voluntary targets for female representation on corporate boards have been adopted by the
United Kingdom and Australia. The United Kingdom normatively stressed in a 2011 Lord
Davies report that the boards of FTSE 100 companies should aim for a minimum 25% female
representation by 2015. 43 Similarly, the Australian government has recently called for ASX 200
companies to voluntarily reach a target of 30% women on their boards by 2018. 44 The call for
more women on corporate boards was initially verbalized by the Australian government in 2012
with the passing of the Gender Equality Act, which held that firms should adopt and publicly
explain a diversity policy. 45

40

The corporate board gender quota trend in Europe partially picked up steam after the European Union proposed, albeit
failed to pass, legislation calling for a mandatory quota with sanctions of 40% females for the boards of publicly traded EU
companies.
Kanter, James. 2013. Push for gender balance on boards gains steam. The New York Times, Jan. 24, 2013, 2013, sec Global
Business. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/business/global/measures-promoting-women-in-business-are-working-redingsays.html
41 Scott, Mary E. 2014. Gender target aims to transform malaysian boards, but may take time. Forbes, July 21, 2014, 2014,
sec Business, http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesasia/2014/07/21/gender-target-aims-to-transform-malaysian-corporate-boardsbut-may-take-time/#25fc57543e92
42 Formally referred to as Section 172 of the Companies Act, the mandate contains a very minute non-compliance penalty
provision that would only marginally influence decision-making, if at all. In particular, a non-complying firm would need to pay
a fine of at least Rupees 50,000 (approximately $800) and up to Rupees 500,000 (approximately $8,000.)
Afsharipour, Afra. 2015. The one woman director mandate: History and trajectory. Corporate Governance in India: Change and
Continuity, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686991
43 With the help of a privately founded organization called the ‘30% Club,’ the country reached surpassed the 25% target in
2016. See http://30percentclub.org/
In 2011, only 12.5% of FTSE 100 board members were women.
Lord Davies of Abersoch. 2011. Women on boards,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-women-on-boards.pdf
44 Khadem, Nassim. Australian institute of company directors wants 30% women on boards by 2018. The Sydney Morning
Herald, April 10, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/business/australian-institute-of-company-directors-wants-30-women-on-boardsby-2018-20150408-1mh0qt.html
45 See https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2012C00899

At the same time, a plethora of countries have issued gender quotas for the boards of
state-owned enterprises, including Denmark, Finland, Greece, Austria, Slovenia, 46 Switzerland,
Ireland, Israel, Kenya 47 and Brazil. 48
Thus, the adoption of gender quotas for corporate boards has rapidly grown over the past
decade, suggesting a common consensus among many nations’ governments that gender quotas
are a valid gender workplace advancement policy tool. To understand the extent to which this is
true, we now analyze the various objectives gender quotas for corporate boards seek to fulfill and
determine whether or not they are first, compelling policy goals and, second, actually satisfied.
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES BEHIND GENDER QUOTAS
Governments have enacted gender quotas for corporate boards in response to a plethora
of empirical research signaling a strong correlation between gender-diverse corporate boards and
heightened corporate financial performance. However, the results of studies analyzing the
relationship between gender diversity on corporate boards and economic profitability are not all
positive. Some researchers argue no statistically significant relationship exists, while others
demonstrate the converse effect – increasing the number of female corporate Board of Directors
decreases firm financial performance.
In any case, as I describe in this Section, empirical analyses have failed to pinpoint a
definitive relationship between gender diversity on corporate boards and corporate financial
performance. The murky literature undermines economic or ‘business case’ 49 rationales in

46
European Commission. 2012. Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report. Luxembourg: European
Union, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf
47
Catalyst. Legislative board diversity. 20142016, http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-board-diversity#footnote1_k692yzn
48 H.J. The spread of gender quotas for company boards. The Economist, March 25, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-14
49
McCann, Mark and Wheeler, Sally, Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The Business Case Claim Explored (December
2011). Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 38, Issue 4, pp. 542-574, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960411 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2011.00558.x

support of gender quotas, and quotas therefore cannot be defended on efficiency or societal
welfare grounds.
Positive Economic Impact
Advocates for gender quotas on corporate boards point to empirical studies finding a
positive correlation between the number of women on corporate boards and company financial
performance. In particular, boards with more female directors have a higher performance by
market, as measured by stock price growth 50, Return on Equity51 and Tobin’s Q 52. In addition,
increasing the number of women on corporate boards yields more profitable accounting
measures, such as Return on Assets 53 and EBIT 5455. Finally, boards with more female directors

50
Found that the 89 European-listed companies with the highest proportions of women in senior leadership positions and
at least two women on their boards outperformed industry averages for the Stoxx Europe 600, with 10% higher return on equity,
48% higher EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes = Revenue – Operating Expenses) and 1.7 times the stock price growth.
Women Matter, McKinsey & Company, 2007 (updated 2013)
51 Based on an analysis of 2,360 companies between 2005 and 2011. Found that the average return on equity (ROE = Net
Income / Shareholder’s Equity) for companies with at least one woman on the board over the six year period was 16%, four
percentage points higher than that of companies with no women on their boards, which was 12%.
Gender diversity and corporate performance, Credit Suisse Research Institute, August 2012.
52
Uses data from over 2,000 US firms in 2013 and shows that gender diversity has a positive effect on the conditional
mean of firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. (Q Ratio = Total Market Value of Firm / Total Asset Value.) Importantly,
demonstrates that female directors have a significantly larger positive impact in high-performing firms relative to low-performing
firms.
Conyon, M. J., & He, L.Firm performance and boardroom gender diversity: A quantile regression approach.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748558
53 The study used data from 3,876 public companies in 47 countries. Terjesen, Siri, Eduardo Barbosa Couto, and Paulo
Morais Francisco. 2015. Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study
of board diversity. Journal of Management & Governance 23 (2): 77.
54
Supra, McKinsey & Company, 2007
55
Studies conducted in Australia and India have also demonstrated improved market and accounting performance for firms
with gender diverse corporate boards.
The Australian study uses data from the top 500 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms for the period 2005-2010.
Vafaei, Alireza and Mather, Paul R. and Ahmed, Kamran, Board Gender Diversity and its Effect on Firm Financial Performance:
A Panel Study of Top 500 ASX Listed Firms (March 26, 2012). 2012 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029140
The Indian study examines the relationship between diversity and firm value for 500 large listed Indian firms, with annual data
from 2003-2013.
Haldar, Arunima and Shah, Reeta and Nageswara Rao, S.V.D., Board Room Diversity and Firm Value: Evidence from India
(March 18, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411382

tend to be more innovative, 56 and make better investment decisions, demonstrated by higher
Return on Investment 57 and lower bid prices for mergers and acquisitions transactions 58.
Analyzing the Efficacy of Theoretical Frameworks Substantiating Positive Economic
Findings
Qualitative rationales supporting the improved financial performance of firms with
gender diverse boards are rooted in the agency theory, resource dependence theory, and upper
echelons theory. 59
Agency Theory
Agency theory addresses the potential principal-agent problem arising from the
separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations. A latent moral hazard
problem exists between principal (owners) and agent (management), necessitating various
control mechanisms to mitigate CEOs from acting in their own self-interest. 60 Agency theory
advocates for an independent board of directors to serve as one such monitoring mechanism. 61
Because inside directors tend to side with their CEO, outside directors can help the board

56 Conducted on a sample of 317 Norwegian firms. Results suggest that attaining critical mass – going from one or two
women (a few tokens) to at least three women (consistent minority) –enhances the level of firm innovation. Innovation was
measured by responses to a 6-8 page questionnaire, which posed 265 questions all measuring levels of innovation on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale.
Torchia, M., Calabro, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women directors on corporate boards: From tokenism to critical mass. Journal of
Business Ethics, 102(2), 299. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0815-z. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10551-011-0815-z
57 The study draws from 1993 and 1998 financial performance data for 127 large US companies and their respective
percentages of women and minorities on their boards of directors.
Erhardt, Niclas L., James D. Werbel, and Charles B. Shrader. 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial
performance. Journal of Corporate Governance 11 (2): 102.
58 Study uses acquisition bids initiated by the S&P 1500 firms during 1997-2009. Shows that each 10% representation of
female directors on a corporate board is associated with a 4.7% reduction in the number of a company’s acquisition bids. In
addition, find that each 10% of female directors on the bidder board is associated with a reduction in the bid premium by 13.3%.
Concludes that women are less overconfident than men.
Levi, Maurice D. and Li, Kai and Zhang, Feng, Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus: Gender and Mergers and
Acquisitions (March 14, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785812 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785812
59 Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P., & Hu, Y. (2006). The determinants and effects of board nomination
committees. Journal of Management and Governance, 10(2), 119–148.
60
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the ﬁrm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307.

61

Baysinger, B.D. and H.N. Butler: 1985, ‘‘Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of
Changes in Board Composition’’, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 1(1): 101–124.

implement higher-value projects if the CEO proposes an inferior project for private gain. 62 A
more diverse board may better monitor managers because board diversity increases board
independence. 63 In particular, researchers who have discovered a positive correlation between
gender diversity and firm financial performance argue that increasing the number of female
corporate board members results in heightened board independence, and consequently, corporate
economic gains.
Nevertheless, the agency theory is not a foolproof explanation of the supposed improved
financial performance of independent corporate boards. Requiring the addition of more outsiders
to the board does not necessarily lead to a more independent board. 64 In fact, unless the new
outside directors are able to directly influence the bargaining process, the board’s independence
remains the same. 65 Independent directors must constitute the majority of the board in order for
the agency theory’s effect to take hold. 66 In addition, the agency theory fails to address motives
of human behavior aside from self-interest that may guide managerial decisions. 67 The theory
also only focuses on one aspect of board work – monitoring management – and does not address
the other, perhaps equally important, roles of corporate board members. 68 Thus, it is unclear
whether the agency theory alone explains the strengthened profitability of firms with
independent corporate boards.
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Yet even if the agency theory’s proposition indisputably holds, it is debatable whether
gender diversity, irrespective of board independence, improves firm financial performance. Two
academic studies have arrived at directly contradictory results. One broad multi-country study
argues that independent directors do not improve firm financial performance unless the board is
gender diversified. 69 They reason gender diversity may serve as a substitute for board
independence, and the presence of outside directors does not necessarily yield an independent
board. 70 At the same time, a study conducted in France after the 2011 implementation of their
quota system discovers the opposite effect. 71 Adding women to a board impacts the decisionmaking process, not because of gender, but rather because women are more likely outsiders. 72
Women offer varied and innovative perspectives because they are “more likely to be junior, less
likely to come from the Grandes Ecoles elite networks, more likely to be foreign, and more
likely to have extensive experience in non-traditional areas like labor or the environment.” 73
Hence, it appears that the factors that improve decision-making on gender-diverse boards are not
specific to gender but instead result from factors that currently correlate with sex but are not
permanent let alone essential traits of women.
Taken together, the two studies show that it is ambiguous whether female characteristics
developed through socialization or the likelihood of women to be independent directors results in
the improved financial performance of gender diverse corporate boards.
Resource Dependence Theory
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Resource dependence theory focuses on the relationship between a firm and its external
environment. It perceives organizations as operating in an open system needing to exchange and
acquire various resources to survive. 74 According to resource dependence theory, the role of
directors is to act as resource providers, or boundary spanners, between firms and their
environments. 75 Directors offer four types of ‘external connector’ benefits. 76 First, they provide
well-rounded information and expertise. 77 Second, directors have access to important
communication channels with external parties, which add value for the firm. 78 Third, board
members garner support commitments for the company from other organizations or groups. 79
Last, directors create legitimacy for the firm within its environment. 80
The presence of independent directors bolsters the effects of the resource dependence
theory. Independent directors have access to valuable knowledge and relationship resources such
as particular expertise, social networks, and legitimacy which can be leveraged in their roles on
the board. 81 Their unique experiences garnered in other companies can be useful for high-level
board decision-making. 82 Furthermore, independent directors are connected with important
external resources, broadening the firms’ boundaries. 83 Because increasing the number of female
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directors enhances board independence 84, the resource dependence theory serves as a reasonable
justification for the positive correlation between gender diversity on corporate boards and firm
financial performance.
Independence aside, it is unclear whether female directors due to their gender alone
contribute to the resource dependence framework. Proponents argue female directors insert
knowledge, skills and experiences to their boards that differ from those of their male
counterparts. 85 Furthermore, women directors have the ability to create linkages to different
parties than men, for example to different customers, suppliers, future employees or suppliers. 86
Finally, the appointment of female directors strengthens the legitimacy of the firm toward
stakeholders 87 -- all upholding the four resource dependence roles of directors.
At the same time, multiple studies suggest that gender diversity on corporate boards does
not contribute to the resource dependence theory. Male and female directors are pulled from the
same recruiting pool and must meet equivalent selection requirements, thereby possessing
roughly the same higher education and industry expertise profiles. 88 Female directors therefore
do not necessarily have knowledge or industry skills distinct from those of their male
counterparts, as the resource dependence theory proposes. 89 In addition, female directors do not
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forge unique stakeholder relationships with customers or employees. 90 No statistically significant
relationship exists between the number of female directors and labor-intensive or consumeroriented corporations, which theoretically would hold if boards were to holistically represent all
stakeholders under the resource dependence framework. 91 Finally, more women on corporate
boards does not clearly result in heightened firm legitimacy among stakeholders. Positive
reputational effects could stem from lurking variables unrelated to a gender diversity on
corporate boards. 92 In addition, the signal of a gender balanced board could be misleading, as it
may over-represent gender diversity among executive management and/ or within the company
as a whole. 93 Hence, the resource dependence theory does not cogently justify the perceived
economic benefits of gender diverse corporate boards.
Upper Echelons Theory
Upper echelons theory offers yet another qualitative rationale for the bolstered financial
performance of gender diverse corporate boards. According to the theory, executives'
experiences, values, and personalities greatly influence their interpretations of the situations they
face and, in turn, affect their choices. 94 Because women and men inherently have varied
backgrounds, gender diversity improves strategic decision-making and board effectiveness,
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leading to a broader range of perspectives, skills and knowledge. 96 On average, gender diverse
groups are more creative and innovative, and thus enhance boards’ problem-solving abilities. 97
In addition, women tend to ask more questions and are often less combative than their male peers
during board meetings, 98 reducing conflict and increasing board efficacy. 99 To proponents of
gender quotas, the upper echelons theory serves as a compelling justification for the improved
financial performance of gender diverse corporate boards.
Nonetheless, the upper echelons theory also faces competing evidence. Female directors
do not necessarily have such varied educational backgrounds and industry experiences from their
male counterparts so as to offer novel perspectives. 100 Furthermore, even if we assume the
substance of decision-making does not change with more women on corporate boards, but the
process of decision-making alters, 101 it is unclear whether the process improves or worsens. For
instance, some researchers argue heterogeneity among board members may increase conflict, 102
thereby reducing board effectiveness and efficiency. 103 Finally, many researchers proclaim one
woman on corporate boards, or ‘tokenism’, bears no influence. 104 They contend women must
obtain a ‘critical mass’ in order for their voices to be heard, which is defined as “going from one
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or two women (a few tokens) to at least three women (a consistent minority).” 105 Nevertheless,
the critical mass theory is not unerring, as research shows some women embrace the ‘first and
only’ female director status; a critical mass of female directors does not necessarily produce
different, and distinctly feminine, boardroom outcomes. 106 Thus, upper echelons theory – women
on corporate boards provide diverse perspectives that improve strategic decision-making and
board effectiveness – is not a forceful justification for the positive correlation between gender
diverse corporate boards and firm financial performance.
Altogether, the agency theory, resource dependence theory and upper echelons theory are
not foolproof rationales for the seemingly improved financial performance of firms with gender
diverse boards. Each addresses a compelling and complimentary overarching role of directors –
controlling/ monitoring, boundary spanner/ service provider, and strategy/ advice giver. 107
However, it is not clear that female directors – due to their gender alone – significantly enhance
corporate boards’ abilities to achieve these objectives and increase their bottom line.
A Note on Gender Diversity and Board Independence
Perhaps the seemingly improved financial performance of firms with gender diverse
boards stems from the fact that women tend to be outsiders, or independent directors who are
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unrelated to firm management. After Norway implemented their mandatory 40% gender quota,
the number of independent directors increased from 46% to 67%. 108 Theoretically, independent
directors – irrespective of gender – are better monitors of management and agents of
stakeholders, offer beneficial relationships to the external business environment, and provide
novel perspectives to enhance board decision-making. 109 Because female directors are much
more often independent directors than males are and independent directors add value with
respect to the agency theory, resource dependence theory and upper echelons theory, it is logical
for firm financial performance to rise with the number of women on corporate boards.
However, directors who meet the regulatory requirements for independence are not
necessarily ‘independent’ with respect to the true meaning of the word – one who exercises
judgement separate from management to further the best interests of shareholders. 110 A
significant rise in director tenure over the past decade has led to the rise of “new insiders” or
hybrid board members who comply with current independence requirements, but possess many
of the traits of corporate insiders. 111 Therefore, it is unclear whether directors who are
independent in name demonstrate the beneficial characteristics of ideal independent directors.
Consequently, it cannot be assumed that because female directors are often independent
directors, 112 firm financial performance will increase.
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The uncertain theoretical support for the supposed positive correlation between the
presence of women on corporate boards and corporate economic health is logical, given that the
empirical findings behind the financial impact of women on corporate boards and firm financial
performance are ultimately mixed.
Negative Economic Impact
Many researchers have identified a negative correlation between gender diverse corporate
boards and firm financial performance. Studies conducted in emerging market economies, such
as Indonesia and Sri Lanka, discovered that more female representation on corporate boards
adversely impacts both accounting (Return on Assets) and market performance (Tobin’s Q.) 113
Even researchers in developed economies argue adding a new woman director spurs a negative
short-run market impact. 114 Investors perceive female directors as less competent than their male
counterparts, thereby selling shares of the company’s stock after female appointments. 115
Moreover, the presence of female directors tends to decrease workforce reductions, increasing
labor costs and reducing short-term profits. 116
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Finally, academics who have analyzed the Norwegian quota in particular have found
adverse financial consequences. The constraint imposed by the quota caused a significant drop in
stock prices at the announcement of the law and a large decline in market performance (Tobin’s
Q) over the following years. 117 In particular, the quota led to younger and less experienced
boards, increasing leverage in acquisitions and deteriorating operating performance. 118
Furthermore, the abrupt increase in Norwegian board independence due to their mandatory
gender quota caused small, young, profitable, non-listed firms to lose the most value, presumably
because they need advice from dependent directors and monitoring by independent directors is
less helpful to spur growth. 119 Last, after the Norwegian government announced a liquidation
repercussion for not meeting the 40% female director requirement, half the firms (particularly
small, successful non-listed companies) exited to an organizational form not exposed to the
law. 120 The response suggests the costs of involuntary board restructuring are higher than
abandoning the exposed organizational form. 121 Thus, mandatory gender quotas produce firms
with either inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards. 122
All in all, the type of market analyzed (emerging v. developed), size of firms (small v.
large), and manner of female director appointment (organic v. mandatory gender quota) cause
variations in economic findings. The existence of both positive and negative correlations
between gender diverse corporate boards and firm financial performance implies that the
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business case rationale for implementing gender quotas are not compelling. This is further
demonstrated by the following studies demonstrating no statistically significant economic gain or
loss by increasing the number of women on corporate boards.
Inconclusive Economic Impact
Ultimately, the effect of gender diverse corporate boards on firm financial performance is
inconclusive. In addition to a positive and negative financial impact, scholars point to no
statistical significance between female representation on corporate boards and firm financial
performance. 123 Empirical results are highly dependent on methodology. The mixed outcomes
reflect the different time periods, countries, economic environments, types of companies, and
measures of diversity and financial performance. For instance, many analyses focused on the
short-term market impact of gender diverse corporate boards, neglecting long-term market
impact which is the “gold standard” measure of value for shareholders. 124 Furthermore, some
researchers attribute the varied findings to the methodological shortcomings in many of the
studies, including small sample size, short-term observations of performance, and the difficulty
of controlling for reverse causation, endogeneity, and other omitted variables that may be
affecting both board diversity and firm performance. 125
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The murky economic evidence may also stem from the varying contexts and board
structures. 126
For example, many studies didn’t analyze the importance of attaining a critical mass of women.
‘Trophy’ board members with unconventional backgrounds may be subconsciously socialized to
adopt the ideas of the majority, preventing the materialization of a potential performance
effect. 127 In addition, the relationship between board characteristics, including diversity, and
company performance may be "complex and indirect." 128 Because boards perform multiple and
varied tasks, diversity may affect different functions in different ways, 129 making it difficult to
establish any consistent relationship between board diversity and firm performance. 130
Although empirical research has drawn much-needed attention to the underrepresentation
of women and minorities on corporate boards, it has not convincingly established that board
diversity – propelled by gender quotas – leads to improved financial performance. 131 Given the
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limitations of these studies, many commentators believe that the "business case for diversity"
rests on other grounds, particularly its effects on corporate reputation and governance
capacities, 132 as seen with the following ‘social good’ arguments for corporate board gender
quotas.
SOCIAL GOOD OBJECTIVES BEHIND GENDER QUOTAS
Social good benefits of increased female board representation have also compelled
politicians to enact gender quotas for corporate boards. As I describe in this part, the presence of
women directors improves corporate social responsibility, reduces earnings management and
fraud, and gives rise to a role model effect which encourages younger women to climb through
the corporate ranks. Nevertheless, it is not clear that social good objectives alone are compelling
enough to warrant the implementation of gender quotas for corporate boards.
Increasing the number of women on corporate boards bolsters corporate social behavior,
such as charitable giving, community involvement and outside recognition of employee
benefits. 133 Corporate philanthropy particularly rises within the realms of the environment, 134
community service, and the arts. 135 An influential qualitative rationale for heightened corporate
social behavior is rooted in within the social role theory. This suggests that men and women
behave according to stereotypes and beliefs, associated with the social role they occupy. Women
are thought to be more ‘communal’ and men more ‘agentic.’ 136 Internationally, women are
132
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strongly associated with traits such as empathy, caring, great concern for others and being
interested in actualizing values in relationships of great importance to community. 137 It is
consequently no surprise that gender balanced corporate boards are more likely to be listed on
Ethisphere Magazine’s ‘World’s Most Ethical Companies’ list. 138
Women are also more likely to adhere to rules and regulations. Empirical evidence
suggests the presence of women on corporate boards reduces earnings management and
improves overall accounting quality. 139 Moreover, securities fraud is mitigated on average with
gender diverse boards, as women tend to be more financially risk-averse than men. 140 Politicians
have therefore speculated whether women's increased participation in corporate financial
decision making could have helped to curb tendencies that caused the most recent financial
crisis. 141 A widely discussed panel at a World Economic Forum in Davos posed the question:
"Would the world be in this financial mess if it had been Lehman Sisters?" 142 Many Davos
participants believed that the answer was no, and cited evidence suggesting that women were
"more prudent" and less "ego driven" than men in financial management contexts. 143
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Finally, increased female representation on corporate boards helps spur the role model
effect. 144 Aspiring women garner motivation by witnessing members of their gender class reach
the upper echelons of corporations. 145 Women directors are also more likely to serve as mentors
for other females in their company or industry, and the receipt of mentorship is critical for
attaining additional board appointments. 146 Gender quotas therefore utilize a demand-side
approach for removing the ‘Glass Ceiling’ by mandating the presence of women on corporate
boards who will hopefully in turn help remove barriers for aspiring young women. 147
Two highly contentious assumptions are embedded within the demand-side approach of
gender quotas. First, it is presumed that female directors care to remove gender-specific
corporate barriers burdening lower ranking women. Evidence suggests some female directors
embrace their first and only status, exhibiting a certain pride in their “outsider” status. 148 They
need no additional reassurance or support from the presence of members of their own
demographic group, and therefore do not have an incentive to expend energy helping their peers
rise through the corporate ranks. 149 Second, it is assumed that female directors are capable of
removing gender-specific corporate barriers burdening lower-ranking women. Empirical
research analyzing the mandatory gender quota in Norway found evidence the reform improved
the representation of female employees at the very top of the earnings distribution – the top five
highest earners. 150 However, they observed no statistically significant change in the gender wage
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gap in Norway. 151 This suggests that the newly elected female directors either did not want to or
could not implement programs to improve workforce equity for lower ranking women.
Furthermore, the reform did not influence the decisions of women more generally – there was no
change in female enrollment in business education programs which is contrary to the
implications of the role model effect. 152 Hence, it is not clear that increased female
representation on corporate boards ignites a role model effect or initiates programs which
encourage equality of opportunity for lower-ranking women in the workforce.
Even if augmenting the number of women on corporate boards leads to heightened
corporate social responsibility as well as stronger adherence to corporate rules and regulations,
such seemingly compelling social good justifications for implementing gender quotas are
undermined by a potential pipeline issue. The pipeline issue points to the lack of qualified
women available to be appointed to corporate boards. 153 Because there are far fewer female
executives than male CEOs, the pool of women meeting the requirements of a qualified board
member are small. 154 In Norway in particular, the pipeline issue has led to the rise of ‘Golden
Skirts’ – women who sit on multiple boards. 155 A recent analysis of Norwegian female directors
after the implementation of the gender quota found that women directors are slightly busier than
men. 156 Consequently, gender quotas may lead to less effective boards because of the lack of
women who have upper-level management experience as well as the potential of qualified
female directors to become overworked given their high demand. 157 It is critical for board
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members to fulfill primary roles as advice-givers and monitors. 158 If they are unable to
effectively do so as a result of mandatory gender quotas, any social good benefits stemming from
the presence of women on corporate boards would be irrelevant. 159 In sum, advancing the ‘social
good’ with the potential for increased corporate philanthropy and reduced fraud are not
persuasive enough objectives for governments to validate the implementation of gender quotas.
EQUALITY OBJECTIVES BEHIND GENDER QUOTAS
Proponents of gender quotas for corporate boards normatively justify the policy tool with
a broad notion of equality. 160 There are two types of equality gender quotas aim to address –
equality of outcome and equality of opportunity.
Equality of Outcome
Gender quotas for corporate boards fulfill their equality of outcome objective. Mandating
that a sizeable proportion of directors be female attempts to equalize gender representation on
corporate boards. The rationale for equality of outcome is rooted in the notion of justice. 161
Women have faced systematic workplace and societal oppression for centuries and therefore
deserve a form of remediation, namely, the assurance that a decent number of board seats – the
end result of climbing the corporate ladder – are reserved for women. 162
However, the equality of outcome justification simply places a Band-Aid on a bullet
wound. Gender quotas for corporate boards do not address the root cause of the problem, which
are the systematic barriers hindering women’s abilities to navigate through the corporate
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echelons. Rather, gender quotas mitigate the symptoms of deep-seated workplace obstacles by
artificially adjusting the proportion of female versus male corporate board members. The
consequences of doing so are best demonstrated through the following track & field metaphor.
Imagine a track race where women and men begin at the same starting point. 163 When the
gunshot is fired and women and men begin running the race, everything appears to be equal
among the two parties. However, with time, women begin to see hurdles in their lanes, while
their male counterparts’ lanes remain clear of any obstacles. 164 Although most women
successfully jump over the first hurdle, they begin to see two, three, four, etc. hurdles manifest
before them. 165 Some women decide to continue to run the race, accepting inevitable defeat due
to their slower pace relative to male counterparts with hurdle-less lanes. An extremely small
minority of super-speed women are able to jump over all of their hurdles and still stay on par
with men, every so often surpass a few men. Nevertheless, the vast majority of women become
exhausted and decide to opt out of the race, not wanting to deal with the negative potentialities of
tripping and falling over the hurdles in their lanes.
Now imagine a group of audience members complain to the referees that the race is
unfair. In response, the referees enact a new policy. Every so often, a referee drives next to the
running competitors in a golf cart, picks up a few women who are still in the process of
completing the race, places them in the passenger’s seat, and drives them to the finish line. The
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referees all agree that this is the best and most efficient policy to ensure fairness in the race,
because now roughly an equal number of men and women reach the finish line in time for an
award.
However, new negative repercussions ensue. The men who would normally win an award
without the golf cart policy feel cheated because a group of women who did not even run the full
race reached the finish line before them. Furthermore, the men who did win an award are
skeptical of and look down upon the abilities of all the female award winners. The male winners
distrust the female winners because they perceive the female runners as cheaters who did not
even run the full race, despite the fact that only a handful of women benefited from the golf cart
policy. Finally, the golf cart policy fails to fix the real issue leading to unfairness in the race,
namely, the removing of the hurdles in women’s lanes. It simply places women at the finish line,
thereby entrenching the focus on gender rather than ensuring that the track & field abilities of
both men and women are equally measured in the race.
Gender quotas for corporate boards are akin to the golf cart policy in the track & field
analogy. Both ensure equality of outcome. However, gender quotas potentially crowd out more
qualified men in the pipeline from being appointed to corporate boards. In addition, they spark
ability skepticism toward female board members, as long-standing male board members question
whether their new female peers attained their board seat due to aptitude or gender alone. Finally,
gender quotas for corporate boards fail to address the real fairness problem – the hurdles in
female workers’ lanes. Significant hurdles for working women include the lingering gender pay
gap, biased expectations for familial responsibilities, childbirth, and ingrained corporate gender
stereotypes or discriminatory practices against women. Thus, although gender quotas for

corporate boards satisfy the normative rationale of equality of outcome, the objective itself is not
compelling.
Equality of Opportunity
Advocates for gender quotas for corporate boards argue the policy achieves equality of
opportunity. 166 However, their assertion has no base. Gender quotas do not meet the criteria
inherent in equality of opportunity because they do not tackle the systematic barriers that are
unjustly preventing working women from rising through the ranks.
With respect to the track & field analogy, equality of opportunity would manifest in any
proposal to remove the hurdles in the lanes of female runners. Once the hurdles are eradicated
and women are free to run in clear lanes, the relative athletic abilities of men and women would
be measured fairly. Unfortunately, gender quotas do not address the removal of the hurdles in the
lanes. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, one cannot assume that women who reach the finish line
in a timely manner (with or without the assistance of golf carts) want to or are able to remove the
hurdles for other women still running the race.
Similarly, within the corporate world, focusing on policies that eradicate systematic
barriers for working women is critical to ensuring a fair rewards system. Embedded obstacles
punish women for an ascriptive characteristic that is beyond their control, rather than
encouraging women to remain in the workforce and compensating them equally with men for
excellence. Indeed, abolishing systematic barriers does not mean everything should be equal in a
strictly formal understanding of the word. Men and women are innately different biologically,
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possess different personality traits through socialization, and play varying roles in society. 167
Removing systematic barriers would therefore entail mitigating the impact of biological
discrepancies (e.g., childbirth for women), lessening entrenched gender discrimination, and
encouraging equalized parental roles between men and women so both have balanced work-life
responsibilities. 168
In sum, gender quotas for corporate boards do not satisfy the criteria necessary to fulfill
their policy objective of equality of opportunity. 169 Because the other arguments in support of
gender quotas – economic, social good, and equality of outcome – have proven to be
unconvincing, it is important to look to a new model for gender workplace advancement policies
as a whole.
SALIENT OBJECTIVES BEHIND GENDER WORKPLACE ADVANCEMENT
POLICIES
The policy objectives behind gender quotas for corporate boards are either unpersuasive
or unmet, undermining the use of gender quotas as a valid gender workplace advancement policy
tool. It is therefore imperative to uncover the salient purposes behind any gender workplace
advancement policy, which I argue are equality of opportunity and autonomy.
Equality of Opportunity, Revisited
Equality of opportunity serves as a robust justification for gender workplace
advancement policies. It ensures the removal of systematic barriers – or hurdles – so women
have the opportunity to rise through the corporate ranks without the presence of undue burdens
stemming from their ascriptive characteristic of sex.
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Equality of opportunity is embedded within a Rawlsian conception of justice. Rawls’
second principle of justice states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged […] and attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” 170 Rawls requires that the
offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit to ensure that everyone has a fair
chance to attain those positions.171 Furthermore, he believes all should have a reasonable
opportunity to acquire skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. 172 Applying the Rawlsian
framework of justice to issues of corporate gender equalities, we can see how equality of
opportunity signifies a compelling rationale as it ensures the promotion of a more equal, and
therefore, just society. 173
Furthermore, equality of opportunity is a much more robust rationale than empirical
claims given its roots in social justice and moral legitimacy. Gender equality is perceived as a
basic human right, and it therefore withstands numerous contexts and applications. Equality of
opportunity consequently serves as a powerful guiding force for governments, and they should
strive to enact gender workplace advancement policies which uphold a Rawlsian conception
justice and advocate for female workplace rights.
Autonomy
The second salient objective behind gender workplace advancement policies is
discovered by posing the following question: what were we trying to achieve by allowing women
to enter the workplace in the first place?
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There are numerous answers, yet I believe the most compelling is female autonomy.
Women should have the freedom to define their careers however they wish without having to
navigate unnecessary constraints imposed on them simply due to their sex – a characteristic they
did not choose and cannot reasonably be asked to change. They should have the liberty to
explore and define their authentic selves within the working world, seamlessly being able to
move betwen industries or climb the corporate ladder if they wish. Women should be rewarded
to the same degree as their male peers if they possess exactly the same levels of work ethic,
interpersonal skills, intelligence, knowledge, and integrity, to name a few. Hence, women’s
rights to truly determine the course their lives in the working world without unfair constraints is
so fundamental to the purpose behind allowing women to enter the workplace in the first place
that autonomy should be considered as one of the two primary policy objectives behind all
gender workplace advancement policies.
BENEFITS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND AUTONOMY AS A MODEL FOR
GENDER WORKPLACE ADVANCEMENT POLICIES
By focusing on equal of opportunity and autonomy as the primary justifications for
gender workplace advancement policies, the economic, social good and equality of outcome
objectives sought by gender quotas will organically follow. Equality of opportunity and
autonomy emphasize removing systematic barriers for women in the workplace and encouraging
women to freely define their careers. These rationales eradicate the hurdles in the metaphorical
lanes of working women, permitting them to run as fast as they wish on their career paths. This
newfound augmented competition between women and men would likely boost economic
productivity and enhance corporate bottom lines. In addition, women would be encouraged to
stay in the race and compete longer, culminating in a more equitable gender distribution among
corporate board members and executive managers; this would in turn produce the respective

corporate social good benefits of increased corporate social responsibility and reduced fraud. In
sum, gender workplace advancement policies focused on promoting equality of opportunity and
autonomy seek to mend the bullet-hole wound of systematic gender barriers. By doing so, the
apparent symptoms of the wound –economic unproductivity, dearth of social good initiatives,
inequality of outcome – will heal on their own with time.
Furthermore, in the United States, policy objectives rooted in equal opportunity and
autonomy would serve as a powerful complement to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title
VII bars intentional discrimination in the workplace, as well as “practices that have the effect of
discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or
sex.” 174 An example of intentional discrimination would be a workplace manager outwardly
berating and cursing only her male employees. Title VII protects the male employees from their
manager’s discriminatory acts, as they were clearly intended to target the male gender class.
However, Title VII largely fails to address or remedy unintentional discriminatory workplace
practices – those which are systemically embedded within the corporate fabric. An example of
unintentional workplace discrimination is lack of both paid maternity and paternity leave, where
women are socially expected to manage both their household affairs and careers even if they do
not have the support of their husbands. Because men are not socially encouraged to slow down
or take time off work to help raise children, they are able to navigate their careers with much
more fluidity than their female coworkers who have to juggle two often conflicting sets of
responsibilities (those of work and home). Policy objectives focused on encouraging equality of
opportunity and autonomy, however, would immediately address unintentional discriminatory
practices such as the lack of paid maternity and paternity leave because it is a clear hurdle
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restraining women from rising through the corporate ranks as seamlessly as their male
coworkers. Hence, the introduction of gender workplace advancement policies promoting equal
opportunity and autonomy, coupled with the presence of Title VII, would result in the holistic
coverage of all types of discrimination against women – both intentional and unintentional.
Finally, workplace policies advocating for equal opportunity and autonomy do not have
to be limited to women alone. The policy model could be adopted to apply to racial minorities,
individuals of various sexual orientations, etc. The fluidity and universality of the model adds to
its appeal, as equality of opportunity and autonomy will likely remain robust policy objectives
across many classes of individuals, political contexts and time periods.
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Two areas of possible contention need to be addressed. First, a proponent of quotas might
wonder whether it wouldn’t be better to implement gender quotas for corporate boards than to
have no policy at all. Norway now has 40% women on their corporate boards, which is twice as
high as the United States’ 19.2% as of 2015. 175 By mandating a gender quota, Norway was
clearly able to progress further than the United States, which simply has an open-ended diversity
disclosure rule. 176
In response, I seek to clarify the definition of progress. If progress is perceived as
increasing the proportion of women on corporate boards, the Norwegian gender quota has been
an effective policy. However, if progress is denoted as encouraging equal opportunity and
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autonomy – the two salient normative objectives in my model for gender workplace
advancement policies – then Norwegian gender quotas have yielded inconclusive results in the
realm of progress. Evidence has shown that the implementation of the mandatory quota in
Norway has led to no change in the gender wage gap, which is an important measure of equality
of opportunity. 177 Because improvement has not been made with respect to equality of
opportunity and autonomy in Norway, it is not clear that salient progress has taken place. As a
result, the implementation of the Norwegian gender quota is not necessarily any better than no
gender quota at all – both are essentially interchangeable in terms of progress.
The second possible point of contention addresses affirmative action programs as a
whole. Given that gender quotas for corporate boards are a type of workplace affirmative action
policy, and the broad class of affirmative action does not conduce to the objectives of equality of
opportunity or autonomy, are all workplace affirmative action policies therefore unconvincing?
Do the arguments here entail that even college affirmative action policies are unpersuasive?
In response, I concede that not all gender workplace advancement policies need to meet
the standards of equal of opportunity and autonomy to justify their existence. Equal opportunity
an autonomy should simply be regarded as sufficient justifications. For example, the Supreme
Court’s majority opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County (1987) has a
compelling justification in support of the agency’s affirmative gender affirmative action program
that promoted Diane Joyce over Paul Johnson after factoring her gender in the decision-making
process. 178 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that women have been
underrepresented in the job dispatcher category, and the transportation agency’s affirmative
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action program did not explicitly set quotas. 179 Diane Joyce was a qualified applicant, and using
gender as one of the many factors to be considered was reasonable in order to remedy past
discrimination. 180 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed, saying that if we were really going to
overcome a long history of gender discrimination, these kinds of measures were needed. 181
Hence, although the gender workplace affirmative action program in Johnson does not explicitly
advance the goals of equal opportunity and autonomy, its existence as a light stepping stone
toward the removal of systematic barriers against women in the workplace is justified.
Moreover, with regard to college affirmative action programs, I believe affirmative action
in higher education and workplace affirmative action are inherently two different policies and
should be analyzed separately. Despite the lack of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in support of
this view, education should be viewed as a fundamental right in today’s society. With this
assumption in mind, college affirmative action programs therefore provide a means to ensure that
classes of traditionally oppressed individuals have the ability to educate themselves and attain a
better life. Furthermore, the systematic barriers preventing minorities from engaging in higher
education programs are so complex that the most effective mechanism in that particular context
would be managing the outcome of higher education enrollment on the basis of ascriptive
characteristics. 182 Workplace affirmative action programs, on the other hand, often serve as a
distraction discouraging governments from addressing the root causes of widely skewed outcome
discrepancies, which can feasibly be tackled and mitigated with a concerted effort. For instance,
politicians are capable of implementing legislation mandating paid maternity and paternity
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leave, for instance, but they persistently fail to do so. Because there are numerous practical
solutions to remedy the inherent systematic barriers (against women and minorities) ingrained in
the workplace, politicians therefore have a duty to focus on removing the hurdles rather than
placing individuals at the finish line.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To promote the salient policy objectives of equal opportunity and autonomy, politicians
should consider implementing the following initiatives to remove entrenched systematic barriers
against working women. The first issue to be addressed should be equal pay for equal work. As
of 2014, working women in the United States made 78 percent of what men earned. 183 In 1994,
women earned 72 percent of every man’s dollar, demonstrating a mere 6 percent decline in the
gender wage gap over 20 years. 184 Indeed, the lack of equal pay for equal work in the United
States, and across the world, disincentivizes women from remaining in the workforce. 185
Furthermore, the minimal progress addressing this issue over the past two decades suggests a
need for equal opportunity and autonomy policy objectives, which would immediately seek to
remedy the gender wage gap to ensure a fair hurdle-less race.
Moreover, the lack of mandated paid maternity and paternity leave creates an undue
societal expectation for women to both manage their careers and home affairs. 186 Women should
not be penalized in the working world just because they biologically bear children, and the social
expectation should be that both men and women work as a team to raise children. In addition,
paid leave has been shown to increase the probability that women continue in their job after
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having a child, rather than quitting permanently, saving employers the expense of recruiting and
training additional employees. 187 Thus, not only would paid maternity and paternity leave
equalize gender responsibilities in the home, it would also incentivize women to remain in the
workforce without sacrificing long-run company profits. 188 Equal opportunity and autonomy
would encourage the implementation of such legislation.
Finally, negative gender stereotypes embedded within corporate culture need to be
tackled, and policies focused on equal opportunity autonomy would be best suited to do so. For
instance, women often lack the presumption of competence enjoyed by men, needing work
harder to achieve the same results. 189 Male achievements are more likely to be ascribed to
individual capabilities such as intelligence, commitment, and drive, while female achievements
are more often attributed to external factors such as chance or special treatment. 190 Furthermore,
characteristics that are assertive in a man may seem abrasive in a woman. 191 Men are more
readily credited with leadership ability and accepted as leaders, while female leaders persistently
risk seeming too feminine or not feminine enough. 192 Clearly, ingrained gender biases hamper
women’s abilities to rise through the corporate ranks. Policies focused on advocating for equal
opportunity and autonomy would best address such negative stereotypes, as they are capable of
tackling the elusive issue of unintentional discrimination within corporate cultures.
CONCLUSION

187

Council of Economic Advisors. 2014. The economics of paid and unpaid leave.
Id.
189
Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women
Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2256 (2010)
190
Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He's Skilled, She's Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of Observers' Attributions for
Women's and Men's Successes and Failures, 22 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 507, 507 (1996)
191
Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders, 109 Psychol. Rev.
573, 578 (2002).
192
Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 Personality &
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1315, 1315, 1325 (2000)
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In sum, gender quotas for corporate boards do not satisfy compelling policy objectives.
Economic justifications for gender quotas hinge upon inconclusive empirical results,
undermining the efficacy of quotas’ ‘business case’ rationales. Social good benefits of gender
quotas, such as improved corporate social responsibility and reduced fraud, are not persuasive
policy objectives alone because their benefits fail to outweigh the underlying pipeline and
fairness issues resulting from gender quotas. Finally, equality rationales validating the
implementation of gender quotas fail to truly distinguish between equality of outcome and
equality of opportunity. By artificially supervising the number of women directors, gender
quotas uphold equal outcome, but perhaps at the expense of equal opportunity because it
entrenches the focus on gender.
Two salient gender workplace advancement policy objectives emerge after analyzing the
rationales behind gender quotas for corporate boards – equality of opportunity and autonomy.
Equality of opportunity is embedded within a Rawlsian framework of justice. It seeks to remove
the systemic barriers preventing women from climbing the corporate ladder. Autonomy
advocates for women to freely be able to define their careers, and in extension their identities,
without unnecessary restrictions placed on them because their sex – a characteristic they did not
choose and cannot reasonably be asked to change. Together, equality of opportunity and
autonomy create a robust policy framework which can ignite the implementation of legislation
that would break down the ‘glass ceiling’ once and for all.
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